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Abstract. The theories of information ethics articulated by Luciano Floridi and his collaborators have clear
implications for law. Information law, including the law of privacy and of intellectual property, is especially
likely to beneﬁt from a coherent and comprehensive theory of information ethics. This article illustrates how
information ethics might apply to legal doctrine, by examining legal questions related to the ownership and
control of the personal data representations, including photographs, game avatars, and consumer proﬁles, that
have become ubiquitous with the proliferation of information and communication technologies. Recent controversy over the control of player performance statistics in ‘‘fantasy’’ sports leagues provides a limiting case for
the analysis. Such data representations will in many instances constitute the kind of personal data that
information ethics asserts constitutes an information entity. Legal doctrine in some instances proves sympathetic to such an assertion, but remains largely inchoate as to which data might constitute a given information
entity in a given instance. Neither is information ethics, in its current state of development, entirely helpful in
answering this critical question. While information ethics holds some promise to bring coherence to this area of
the law, further work articulating a richer theory of information ethics will be necessary before it can do so.
Key words: avatar, copyright, data representation, Floridi, information entity, information ethics, information
law, intellectual property, law, privacy, right of publicity

Introduction
Over the past decade, Luciano Floridi and his collaborators have articulated an increasingly elaborate
vision of information ethics, an ethical system based
upon the primacy and moral worth of ordered
informational structures (Floridi 1999, 2003; Floridi
and Sanders 2001). Building from an established base
in computer ethics, they have developed insights from
information theory into a generalized framework for
ethical analysis. Central to this system is the concept
of the information entity, an autonomous information object inhabiting an infosphere comprising both
tangible and intangible informational patterns. Since
the Floridian infosphere encompasses the environment inhabited by information entities, it broadly
includes informational interactions among material
objects. Nonetheless, even though the world of atoms
is awash in information, informational objects, and
information entities, and information ethics has
broad applicability to physical interactions, it is from
the world of bits, from cyberspace if you will, that the
theory arises, and from which many of its most
compelling case studies arise.

Such a system of ethical principles has clear
implications for legal doctrine. Law as a formalized
and applied set of ethical practices is ultimately
grounded in some framework of guiding principles;
information ethics aspires to provide such principles.
At its broadest expanse, information ethics potentially applies to essentially every area of the law, to all
the rules concerned with arranging and ordering life
in the world of atoms (Negroponte 1995, p. 237). But
it is in the areas of information law, in the legal
doctrines that are increasingly concerned with bits
rather than with atoms, that information ethics may
ﬁnd its ﬁrst and most straightforward application.
Just as information ethics arises out of computer
ethics, its application to the legal structures grows
most naturally out of an application to information
law.
Although he has said relatively little to date
about the application of information ethics to
information law, it seems clear that this connection
has not escaped Floridi. His illustrations draw on
the language of legal categories. He compares
invasion of privacy to personal injury such as
assault or kidnapping and rejects comparisons to
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trespass (Floridi 2005, 2006). He has already begun
some preliminary exploration of the relationship
between information ethics and privacy, and by
implication of the relationship between information
ethics and the law of privacy (Floridi 2005). Such a
relationship in turn implicates other areas of information law, most especially privacy’s fraternal twin,
the right of publicity, and an array of intellectual
property regimes that might be applied to information objects.
Comprehensive mapping of information ethics to
legal principles generally, or even to information law
generally, will be an extensive undertaking. But we
can begin such a project on a smaller scale, considering in a limited case the ways in which information
ethics may be consonant with current information
law, and the ways in which it might be dissonant. In
this essay I trace the contours of a legal problem to
which information ethics might be applied, cataloging the relevant legal doctrines, their ethical underpinnings, their compatibility with a theory of
information ethics, and the prospects that information ethics might provide an ethical framework
superior to that currently in place. My focus is on the
kind of constitutive data that Floridi argues makes
up an individual as an information entity, and most
particularly on collections of personalized information that are intended to represent all or part of the
individual. Such data representations might range
from a photograph to a genomic database to a
gaming avatar. I hope to show what account the law
presently takes of such representations, and what
account it might take of them with the application of
information ethics.
My entry point into this investigation is the recent
case considering the right of publicity claims for
athlete performance statistics used in Internet
‘‘fantasy’’ sports competitions. This case allows me to
introduce both the right of publicity and a limiting
case for legal recognition of data representations. I
sketch the relationships between rights of publicity,
rights of privacy, and other bodies of intellectual
property that might be applied to personal data
representations. I then turn to the assignment of
ownership implicit in various theories of information
law, the ethical assumptions behind such assignments, and the structural gaps in those assumptions.
Having identiﬁed certain deﬁciencies in the current
legal framework, I ask whether information ethics
might be able employed to better structure information law. I conclude that information ethics in its
current form is not up to the task, but that a richer
theory of information ethics holds promise for lending coherence to the law relevant to data representations.

The law of fantasy sports
Professional athletes and their aﬃliated teams have
recently asserted proprietary control over the representation of the sports ﬁgures in on-line ‘‘fantasy’’
sports competitions. In such fantasy competitions, a
competitor speciﬁes on the Internet a virtual team of
athletes, based upon statistical conﬁgurations from
the real-world performance of physical sports players. Fantasy teams progress in virtual tournaments
according to the corresponding real-world performance of the players represented by the statistical
sets. In C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Mass Media players and
their teams lost a challenge to the use of these
statistics, but the resulting opinion of the court provides an entry point into the law concerning data
representations.
Although the case encompassed a variety of
claims and counter claims, the court’s holding was
centered upon the plaintiﬀ’s right of publicity
claims. In the United States, the right of publicity
evolved, primarily at common law, with some statutory prompting, in order to secure commercial
control by a celebrity over that individual’s public
persona (McKenna 2005). Technically, rights of
publicity come out of the tort system, the legal
regime for redress of personal wrongs and injuries,
and so are not a form of property, but rather secure
compensation to celebrities for commercial and
dignitary injuries they suﬀer from unauthorized use
of their public persona. As a practical matter,
however, the right of publicity has evolved toward a
full-ﬂedged form of intellectual property, with the
characteristics of exclusion, exchange, and disposition that come with a property regime. The right of
publicity has been used by celebrities and by their
estates to assert not only exclusivity over largely
natural characteristics, such as facial image or tone
of voice, but also over artiﬁcially constructed public
depictions of the celebrity, such as the portrayal of
Dracula by ﬁlm actor Bela Lugosi, or the unauthorized use of distinctive catch-phrases associated
with the celebrity to imply celebrity endorsement of
a product.
In the C.B.C. Distribution opinion, the court held
that the numeric representation of player performance was not suﬃciently distinctive of their personality to ground a right of publicity claim. The
court’s holding focused on whether the use of the
players’ names in conjunction with their statistical
records was the appropriation of a ‘‘symbol of their
identity.’’ In other words, the court considered whether the use of the statistics was representative of the
individual, or was simply the use of the data as data.
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The court concluded that use of such factual, historical data did not implicate the character, personality, reputation or physical appearance of the
players.
In particular, the court distinguished previous
similar cases as involving the appropriation of likeness. This analysis relied upon distinctions developed under the commercial right of privacy cases.
The terminology of ‘‘privacy’’ is somewhat problematic; a ‘‘right of privacy’’ is in American law a
term with so many aspects that it almost has no
proper meaning. Various facets of the polyglot
American right of privacy are drawn from scattered
statutory or constitutional sources. Some of these
deal with physical or bodily integrity, such as the
constitutional rights against governmental invasion
of the home or of reproductive activities. Others
deal with personal data generated in the ordinary
course of human activity: records of ﬁnancial dealings, credit worthiness, social security identiﬁcation,
or medical history (Reidenberg 2000; Swire and
Litan 1998).
In this particular instance, the court was concerned with a line of tort cases restricting the commercial use of a private individual’s likeness without
that individual’s permission. These are the close
cousin of the right of publicity cases, and early on
the two lines of cases were closely intertwined,
sharing similar precedent and reasoning. Such right
of personal privacy claims were essentially the private citizen’s analog to the right of publicity claim;
the one for the average person, the other for
celebrities; one grounded in a right not to have one’s
image commercially exploited, the other grounded in
the right to control commercial exploitation that
was routine and indeed expected as part of the
celebrity’s career (Malkan 1997).
The court’s reliance on cases involving the common law right of privacy is critical because of the
conceptual convergence between the private claim to
prevent exploitation and the celebrity claim to control exploitation. The two lines of cases share a
common lineage, but more importantly share a
common set of rationales regarding the individual’s
relationship to representations of likeness or identity.
I have argued elsewhere that the law of privacy and
the law of intellectual property comprise a matched
pair of modalities for assigning control of data in
modern information law (Burk 2006b). Here the
convergence between the two is manifest in the analytical reliance upon privacy to resolve a question of
publicity. While a distinction between the two kinds
of cases is doctrinally correct, the distinction dissipates at a conceptual level, opening a window into
the connected structures of information law.
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The law of data representation
In certain respects, the C.B.C. Distribution suit was
far from extraordinary. Protection of celebrity likenesses from unauthorized commercial appropriation
has long been part of the American legal landscape,
and celebrities have gone to court to prevent the
appropriation of performance attributes ranging
from distinctive singing styles to celebrated character
roles to eponymous catch phrases. The right of
publicity, the central legal theory in the case, has long
been in a period of expansion, growing despite constitutional guarantees of free speech to cover the
personas of deceased celebrities, parody or commentary on celebrity, and even to preclude allusions
to celebrity (McKenna 2005).
But at the same time, this suit was in many respects
quite extraordinary, in part because it may represent
the high water mark for claims regarding celebrity
attributes, a claim to control over a set of minimalist,
publicly available statistics regarding player performance. The plaintiﬀs sought protection for numeric
representations of player performance – in eﬀect, for
the most bare-bones kind of data about the players,
for facts about the players. Not all data is factual of
course, but the argument of the case equated the
persona of the players with data constituting numerical representations of player performance. In seeking protection for facts about player performance, the
plaintiﬀs appeared to push the right of publicity to its
outer limits, and it is such limiting cases that reveal
the underlying assumptions that structure intellectual
property rights.
Under most branches of information law, facts
would be considered unprotectable. For example,
copyright is an unlikely regime to protect such personal data. Copyright extends only to works of original expression, that is, to creative expression
originating from an author. The copyright statute
excludes facts and other empirical representations,
including many if not most databases, and most data
representations in digital media can be considered as
databases of varying complexity (Burk 2005). The
creative arrangement of uncopyrightable elements
can qualify for copyright, but this covers only the
arrangement, not the arranged elements. And creative arrangements may be somewhat rare; the useful
arrangement of data is frequently dictated by
unoriginal considerations, such as alphabetical or
numerical order, that will not qualify for copyright.
Despite the somewhat fanciful argument advanced
by some commentators that the individual choices
about the persona might constitute creative expression within the subject matter of copyright (Bartow
2000), personal facts are unlikely to constitute a
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compilation for purposes of copyright. Even very
complex distinctive features of an individual, such as
facial features, are unlikely to be considered creative
expression for purposes of copyright. The argument
that bodily attributes are in some sense creative is not
without foundation, as it could constitute a logical
endpoint to some court decisions about the scope of
copyright. I have observed elsewhere that certain
recent copyright decisions have blurred the line
between expressive choices and determined choices
(Burk 2007). However, it seems unlikely that any
court, even courts with an expansive view of copyrightable expression, would consider seriously either
the choices made in an individual’s life, or the attributes proceeding from such choices, as the type
of original expression addressed by the copyright
system. Such personal choices and attributes are
far more likely to be classiﬁed as factual rather
than expressive, and so excluded from copyright
protection.
The law of trademarks lies closer in concept, if not
in speciﬁc detail, to the type of legal structure that
might recognize and accommodate interests in personal data representations. Trademark law incorporates into its doctrines a strong theme of protection
the goodwill and reputation of businesses – that is,
control over the public image and perception of a
business and of the business’ products (McKenna
2007). Thus trademark law is directed to indicia, such
as words, phrases, logos, and other representations
generated about a given business, in many ways
paralleling a regime directed to the indicia and representations that might be generated about an individual. But this is only a parallel, not an exact match.
Trademark law is speciﬁcally limited to the business
context, and typically will not cover personal data.
To qualify for trademark status, an indicator must
designate the source of goods or services in commerce. Persona or personal identities are unlikely to
qualify as goods or services, and are not necessarily
used in commerce. Certainly in certain circumstances,
such as that of celebrities whose persona is in many
ways the commodity they sell, commercial information and personal information may merge, but the
majority of data representations will fall into this
category.
At some point such claims certainly intersect with,
and perhaps conﬂict with, other regimes of control,
such as the copyright or trademark systems. Actors
such as Clayton Moore, Adam West, or Buster
Crabbe may have been for many years associated
with the ﬁctional characters they portrayed in ﬁlm or
television: the Lone Ranger, Batman, or Tarzan.
But those characters are also literary properties of
the movie studios, the print media publishers, and

ultimately the authors who initially characterized
those ﬁgures, and so subject to copyright of those
creators. The characters may also be emblematic of the
businesses that created and promoted products featuring those characters, and association of the characters with those businesses in the minds of the public
may the characters as trademarks of those businesses.
Thus it is no wonder that it was under the right of
publicity, the commercial interest lying closest to the
common law right of privacy, that the ‘‘fantasy
sports’’ plaintiﬀs grounded their claim. The court
nonetheless rejected the claim, much as it might have
rejected a copyright claim to facts, due to the public
nature of the statistics involved. But even though the
court focused on the public nature of the data at
issue, the more striking feature of the case may be the
reductionist nature of the data at issue: the plaintiﬀ’s
claims necessarily equate the identity of certain individuals with numerical data about those individuals,
claiming that the data is suﬃciently distinctive to
constitute the persona of the players. The C.B.C.
Distribution case thus provides a limiting case to
consider where we might situate such factual representation in either information law or information
ethics.

A bestiary of data representations
The issues attending data representations are in one
sense nothing new. Player statistics long pre-date the
current crop of information and communication
technologies (ICTs), and the earliest American right
of publicity cases stem from the unauthorized representation of sports ﬁgures on baseball trading cards
that were packaged as a novelty with chewing gum.
Portraiture, in marble or paint or celluloid ﬁlm has a
long history. Biographers back to ancient times
depicted detailed textual portrayals of their subjects.
Population census has been a ﬁxture of social life as
long as there have been taxes to collect and governments to collect them.
But what Floridi has dubbed the ‘‘radical reontolozation’’ of the infosphere by ICTs has profoundly changed the nature and frequency of such
representations (Floridi 2006). These examples of
past data representations were largely limited to those
wealthy or prominent enough to merit or aﬀord
them. The wealthy and famous are of course still
more likely to be the subject of information records,
but data representations are also now routinely generated and kept in a wide range of commonplace
situations. In some instances, data representations
are unintentionally generated by the everyday activity
of the individual, or captured without the individual’s
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consent in a manner that might be objectionable were
it noticed or fully drawn to the individual’s attention.
Records of credit card purchases or of surveillance
cameras have become a routine feature of urban
industrialized living. In other instances, development
data representations are the product of acquiescence,
as in the formation of medical records or the ﬁlling
out of a credit application. The individual is cognizant and compliant, if not necessarily enthusiastic,
about providing the personal data to be recorded.
In yet other instances, the creation of data representations are the product of active participation or
directed activity on the part of the individual, whether posing for a portrait or developing a role-playing
game avatar. Here it is likely that the individual is the
most proactive in creating the representation of self.
The degree of cognizance and intent in creating the
representation seems bound up with the degree to
which the data representation constitutes an information entity as Floridi has deﬁned it. By contrast,
unconscious or inadvertent generation of data, generated as the individual her activity is routinely
monitored or recorded, seems least likely to reﬂect
the autonomy integral to the deﬁnition of an information entity. These traces of informational activity
often fall into the category that Westin (1968) refers
to as the individual’s ‘‘data shadow’’; records which
are generated by the passage of the individual
through across a landscape of recording devices.
Floridi has relied upon Westin’s distinction to
separate data constitutive of the self from that which
merely describes the activities of the self (Floridi
2005). But it is worth noting that this diﬀerentiation
is problematic. Wiener famously described humans as
‘‘persistent information patterns’’ (1954, p. 96), but
those patterns are part of and not separate from the
larger infosphere; the human patterns bleed into the
information environment while also taking their
shape from it. It is not at all clear where to draw a line
between constitutive and descriptive data; ostensibly
descriptive data, about the individual or the individual’s activities, might well be a major component of
constitutive data, especially in the environment of
ICTs. And the ability to assemble, process, and mine
such records has begun to transform the data shadow
into a full-ﬂedged data portrait, in some cases
revealing patterns of behavior and practice of which
the subject may not be aware.
The development and increasing availability of
digital media has greatly facilitated the creation,
manipulation, and alteration of data representations – an aspect of the ‘‘radical re-ontologization’’
that Floridi contends ICTs have introduced into the
information environment. This is true of representations at all levels of intentionality, but the eﬀects on
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the last category, the proactive formation of data
representations, is of particular interest to this analysis. In some instances, digital media has made new
data representations possible, as in the case of gaming
avatars that allow the average person considerable
latitude in developing and portraying a digital
persona.
In many other instances, digitization and associated technological tools have allowed changes,
sometimes drastic changes, in the character of data
representations. For example, digital image processing famously allowed alteration of ﬁlm footage from
a classic Fred Astaire dance routine to insert new
images, making it appear that the entertainer was
dancing with a Dust Devil vacuum cleaner. Similar
and increasingly more sophisticated techniques have
been employed commercially, to make Gene Kelly,
Audrey Hepburn, Humphrey Bogart and other
deceased celebrities appear to endorse current consumer products, or artistically to place current performers such as Woody Allen, Tom Hanks or Jodie
Foster into archival ﬁlm footage so as to appear to
interact with past celebrities. These techniques allow
the fusion of two diﬀerent representation technologies; traditional cinematic capture of an actor’s
character portrayal and computer image processing
of that portrayal. The most recent generation of such
techniques includes the digital sensor motion capture
of an actor’s character portrayal, which is then
re-formulated to produce an entirely diﬀerent
appearance, in movies such as The Lord of the Rings
or Beowulf.
The trend apparent in such visual representations,
appears to be an increasing divorce of celebrity representation from association with a physical individual, accelerated by the capabilities of digital media. A
similar progression of physically and graphically
simulated portrayals can be seen in the trajectory of
‘‘virtual’’ performers in the music industry. The
depiction of musical personas progresses from musicians speciﬁcally assembled into a band and assigned
personas for the television show ‘‘The Monkees’’;
through the ‘‘Partridge Family,’’ a group of television
actors portraying a musical group, only two of whom
performed musically, and whose music was largely
dubbed by unseen and unrecognized backup musicians; to a group of unseen studio musicians providing music (including a hit single) for an animated
television cartoon band the ‘‘Archies’’ to the elaborate invented personal histories and ﬁctional personalities of the virtual band ‘‘Gorillaz.’’ This
progression approaches its apex in the digital creation
of a Japanese ‘‘Virtual Idol’’ pop star DK96, known
also as Kyoko Date. The logical endpoint of the
trend is that described in William Gibson’s science
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ﬁction novel Idoru in which the pop star is an
artiﬁcial intelligence, but that apex remains for the
moment out of our technological reach (Gibson
1996).
The trajectory of such entertainment depictions
suggests a diﬀerence of degree rather than one of
kind; while each of these representations incorporates
some aspect of an autonomous carbon-based intelligence, and is to some degree representative of that
individual’s personality or character, all involve a
greater or lesser degree of calculated artiﬁce. It is by
no means clear that the personas created and depicted
by physical actors in the ‘‘Monkees’’ are any more
‘‘real’’ or ‘‘genuine’’ than the personas drawn and
depicted in the cartoon ‘‘Archies’’ characters. Certainly both were from a commercial standpoint successful extensions of the abilities of the individuals
involved, and were undoubtedly valuable to their
entertainment careers. To some degree they depicted
some aspect of the individuals whose talents were
incorporated into the depictions. But it is unclear to
what extent either should be considered constitutive
of the self, except perhaps that the cartoon seems
more clearly separable from the underlying performer. In either case it is somewhat unclear what ‘‘I’’
might mean were either Davy Jones of the Monkees
or Ron Dante the of the Archies to say ‘‘I had a hit
single.’’
Each of these commercial personas would be
encompassed to a greater or lesser degree by a network of intellectual property, including copyright
and trademark protection, with the right of publicity
likely becoming increasingly attenuated as the representations of identity become increasingly divorced
from an actual person. Were someone to create an
unauthorized depiction of Kyoko Date, any claim
against the infringer would likely sound in copyright;
until virtual performers are in fact AIs, and such AIs
are recognized as personalities separate from their
programmers, it seems unlikely that any court would
recognize a right of publicity for such a performer.
But it is also unclear if one were to mimic, say, the
performance of the Archies, what right would be
implicated – the right of publicity of the ﬂesh and
blood musicians who provided the sound for the
cartoon band, or the copyright in the cartoon characters whose sound is provided by the musicians?
Similarly it seems unclear what rights might be
implicated by mimicking the of the Gollum character
portrayed in Peter Jackson’s cinematic rendering of
The Lord of the Rings – leaving aside the contributions of the director and other cinematic collaborators, would an infringement implicate the rights of
Andy Serkis, the actor whose movements were captured for digital manipulation into the Gollum image,

or those of the digital artists who transformed the
data into an image altogether diﬀerent than that of
the actor?

A typology of data ownership
As the discussion to this point illustrates, information
law must accommodate a wide range of data representations. We must sort them into some type of
order before we can determine their amenability to
analysis under information ethics. Fortunately, certain tools are readily at hand. The conjunction of
intellectual property and privacy allows us to draw
upon previous analyses of informational privacy in
developing a more general theory of control over
data representations. Particularly, in discussing the
disposition of personal health and medical data,
Annamarie Carusi (unpublished conference presentation, 2006) sets out a useful typology of data origination that bears upon the disposition of control
over the resulting information. But this typology
applies to the disposition of information generally,
whether under the rubric of ‘‘privacy’’ or that intellectual property. The four approaches to data origination set out in the typology are useful in
identifying, sorting through, and making sense of the
regimes that might be applied to ownership and
control of data representations.
The ﬁrst approach in this typology adopts a posture of neutrality, assuming that data pre-exist in the
universe, waiting to be found by human agents. Acts
of measurement and recording are akin to capture
rather than to creation. This approach assumes
transparency for measuring and recording processes,
that they simply reveal what is already ‘‘out there’’ to
be discovered. This approach also assumes that data
is not especially generated by or connected to a particular individual except insofar as the individual may
be a phenomenon observed, like any other physical
phenomenon. The implication of these assumptions is
that data do not belong a priori to anyone; control
may be assigned on the basis of capture or possession, but anyone would be free to capture or record
the data from its natural state.
This approach is somewhat appealing due to its
simplicity; its neutrality lends itself to a rule of ‘‘ﬁrst
possession’’ or perhaps ‘‘ﬁnders keepers.’’ But the
simplest rule may not be the most desirable rule, from
the standpoint of fairness, or eﬃciency, or other
distributive values we might prefer. Even if data are
waiting to be found, certain personal information
may have a social provenance that impacts the subject of that data. And, as we have seen, many types of
personal data are actively created or fashioned by the
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individual. The approach seems unduly naı̈ve about
the nature of measurement and recording, which
since at least Heisenberg can hardly be viewed as
separable from the inﬂuence of the observer.
Thus, a second approach might take into account
the interests of the individual about whom data is
collected. And, indeed, the law of privacy frequently
views personal data as originating in the individual
with whom the data is associated. Under this view,
when an individual is tracked or assessed or measured, the data is eﬀectively a product or an extension
of that individual. The data belongs to the individual
in the sense that it is associated with him; it comes
from him and is in some sense a part of him. And of
course it is only a short semantic move from saying
the data belongs to the individual in an associative
sense to saying that the data belongs to the individual
in a propertized sense.
Alternatively, however, under a third view, the
data generated about an individual might equally well
be viewed as arising from the actions of the observer,
created by the choice to observe or to measure. For
example in the case of medical data, the data is
generated by the tests and assessments performed on
a patient by the physician. Without the actions of the
physician, the data would not have been generated,
and the character of the data is determined by the
choices and judgments of the physician. The same
might be said of other data, such as sports statistics;
they could be considered the result of records compiled by fans or professional leagues or journalists.
Patients and sports ﬁgures seldom record their own
statistics; the vital signs of a patient or the eﬀorts of a
player would not be translated into data representations without the actions of an observer.
Viewing such data the result of the choices made
by the observer shifts the associations underlying
ownership and control of the data. When the focus
shifts to the observer, our impulse is to assign ownership or control to the observer, who is now considered as the creator of the data. Certainly, there
must be a patient or a player to be observed, but then
there must be an object of observation in any measurement. If we view the data as the result of observation, there is no particular reason why we need
assign control of the data to the observed individual,
anymore than we would feel obliged to try to assign
control of weather data to the atmosphere, or of
cloud chamber data to the leptons and muons it
records.
But this rationale cannot be entirely satisfactory.
The observer and recorder of human data representations are not functioning in a moral vacuum.
Unlike the observation of weather or subatomic
particles, observation and measurement of another
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human implicates the interests and autonomy of a
sentient being other than the observer. Leaving the
interests of the observed individual out of the calculus
for control of data representation is just as problematic as ignoring the role of the observer in generating the data. Both an observer and an observed
are necessary to the creation of the data; neither
alone is suﬃcient.
Consequently, a fourth approach might be considered, an approach that views data generation systemically, as arising out of the interaction between
the observer and the observed. Under this view, as the
joint product of observer and observed, data reﬂects
the choices made by each party to the interaction,
and constitutes an extension of each. And, following
the logic of assignment from the ﬁrst two approaches,
if ownership or control of data is to be given to the
party that generated it, it follows that shared action
implies shared control of the result. While this conclusion avoids the polar extremes of viewing either
observer or observed in isolation, it entails its own
practical problems. The application of this approach
is not as clean or as clear cut as that of the other
approaches. The logic of joint creation requires us to
negotiate the tricky mechanics of structuring a regime
for apportioning or sharing control over the information. While this approach oﬀers a richer view of
data origin, it may simultaneously result in a more
complex assignment of rights, and so a greater propensity for uncertainty and for conﬂict over those
rights.

The typology and the law
This typology of data origin is useful because each of
these approaches has been seen not only within the
law of informational privacy, but within the law of
intellectual property. Thus, as I have mentioned
above, copyright adopts the ﬁrst approach in
assuming that ‘‘facts’’ exist independently in the
universe, and lie outside copyright because they are
not the product of the author (Burk 2005, 2007).
Some language in the C.B.C. Distribution opinion
seems to adopt this approach for the right of publicity, suggesting that player statistics do not involve
any protected aspects of the player persona, because
they constitute independently available facts. But this
argument simultaneously implies that where aspects
of persona are involved, such as a player image, this
stems from the individual depicted, and the right of
publicity extends protection to that depiction: an
adoption of the second approach.
The European approach to personal data privacy
likewise adopts the second conception of data origin,
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treating data as an extension of the individual or of
the individual’s personality. The EU directive on data
privacy requires EU member states to enact legislation that essentially regards control over personal
data as a fundamental right of the individual. The
directive requires that individuals be notiﬁed about
data collection, explicitly consent to the collection of
their data, and grants them certain rights to review,
correct, and purge data records (Reidenberg 2000).
Data emanate from the individual, and so remain
subject to the control of the individual, at least to a
certain extent.
In contrast to this European approach, the
American approach to personal data privacy eﬀectively adopts the third conception of data origin.
Consumer ‘‘data trails’’ of supermarket purchases,
magazine subscriptions, telephone records, and credit
ratings have generally been assumed to belong to the
institutions, typically commercial institutions, that
gathered or compiled the records (Swire and Litan
1998; Starke-Meyering et al. 2004). The recording
entity has generally had broad discretion to buy, sell,
trade, stockpile, and analyze such records, subject
only to minimal constraints allowing the subjects of
such records to ‘‘opt out’’ of certain types of trading
or selling of their proﬁles. There are some sparse
statutory restrictions on the use of records considered
particularly sensitive, such as medical records or
credit records. These few idiosyncratic statutes place
somewhat more stringent controls upon dissemination of the records they cover. But these restrictions do not change the underlying assumption of
American data records law: it is generally assumed
that the records are properly in the custody of the
recorder, almost completely under the control of the
recorder, and constitute the property of the recorder.
The individuals represented by such data have little
or no entitlement to access or re-purpose the records.
The role of the subject recorded is subordinated or
unimportant; it is the action or investment of the
recorder that is foregrounded.
Other data representations appear to fall within
regimes that adopt the fourth approach For example,
I have previously argued that the proper ethical and
legal framework for consideration of gaming avatars
lies within copyright’s regime for mixed origination
(Burk 2006a). The ownership and control of gaming
avatars, game items, and scenaria has been the subject of considerable discussion, and of occasional
outright disputes between the players of role-playing
games, and the providers of such games. For the most
part, such disputes are controlled by contract law:
before they will allow users to play their games, game
owners typically require the player to assent to terms
of use agreements that allocate copyright in any

characters or scenario features to the game owner.
These terms grant the player a license to use the
copyrighted works in the game, and may require an
assignment of rights in return. Such agreements
cannot override the deﬁnition of authorship under
law of copyright – private agreements cannot change
legislative enactments – but the contractual terms of
use may re-assign whatever copyright claims the user
may have to the game provider, as a condition of
access.
Thus the user licenses for games provide a private
answer to the question of ownership and control; an
ownership contingency is transferred to the game
provider before the game ever begins. But behind
such licenses typically lies an assertion of copyright:
one cannot determine whether a transfer is eﬀective
unless one knows what is available to transfer. Game
providers have addressed the underlying assertion of
copyright on the basis that the development of
characters in the game scenario is attributable to the
software options provided by the game owner. The
providers argue that the avatars in a game, their
actions and their attributes, are drawn from a suite of
graphical depictions provided by the game owner.
Avatars are stored as data, on the hardware of the
game owner, and are translated into graphical and
auditory depiction by the software of the game
owner. The actions and storylines manipulated by
players are reliant upon and derived from copyrighted works provided by the game owner: libraries
of graphics and sound, sequences and ordered by the
game software. Thus game providers argue that any
character generated by game play lies within the
expression of the game, within parameters speciﬁed
by the game producer, and hence is subject to the
game owner’s copyright.
This logic is ﬁne so far as it goes, but it cannot
negate the contribution made by the player. Even if
the choices for character development are ﬁnite, and
supplied by the game owner, the number of choices is
typically quite large, and the selection of character
attributes and activities is almost certainly creative
and original with the players, as such choices are
viewed under copyright. The fact that the suite of
choices is original with the game creator does not
change the fact that the selection among the choices is
almost certainly original with the players; both have
had original input into the character that is formed
from their contributions. This seems to place game
avatars within one or more categories of shared
authorship recognized by the copyright system. If the
additions of original expression are authorized and
sequential, then the result constitutes a derivative
work of the game owner’s initial work, and each
contributor would hold copyright in her contribution
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to the ﬁnal product. If the contributors had an intent
to produce a uniﬁed, integrated end product, then the
result constitutes a work of joint authorship, and
each contributor holds a complete and undivided
interest in the resulting copyright. Depending upon
the particular facts of a gaming situation, one or both
of these designations could apply, but each of them
attempts to recognize the interactive nature of the
contributions from both game player and game
owner.
The logic of the fourth approach seems also well
illustrated by the view of the court in C.B.C. Distribution on player statistics that deﬁne fantasy sports
teams. As I have already noted, these statistical
notations are exceptionally sparse as data representations go. Taken in isolation, they have little or no
meaning – they are simply a string of numbers that
might represent almost anything: the measurements
for shelving in someone’s hall closet; the gross
national product of central African nations rounded
to the nearest hundred thousand Euros; the numerical doodling of an idle mathematician. Without the
addition of considerable contextual information, it is
impossible to know which of these, if any, or of any
myriad other possibilities the numbers might be
properly be mapped. The correspondence of the data
to measured phenomenon emerges only in the context
of a newspaper sports page, or a sports almanac, or a
fantasy sports competition. Only when juxtaposed
against additional external information do the numbers begin to become meaningful as player statistical
averages. The correspondence of the numbers to
individuals is not inherent in the data; recognition of
the numbers as somehow personal requires additional
outside context to attach the data to particular sports
ﬁgures.
It is worth noting that such decontextualization is
routinely used in the law and practice of data privacy
to provide sterile numbers for research or other
manipulation. Concerns over autonomy and conﬁdentiality are often considered alleviated through
anonymization of the data, isolating it from particularized associations with individuals. Once such
associations are gone, the numbers are no longer tied
to a discrete identiﬁable individual, and so no longer
considered subject to the consent or control of that
individual. Such neutered indicia implicitly demonstrate the communal construction of personal data.
Stripped of context, sensitive data is transformed
from an extension of persona to free standing statistics that no longer implicate the individual with
whom they were originally associated. The data are
not essentially tied to the individual; such ties disappear with the context.
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Such data represent the limiting case for the logic
of the fourth approach. Diﬀerent types of individual
data will show this characteristic to a greater or lesser
extent. Some data, such as sports statistics will be
unrecognizable even as personal data unless labeled
as such. Other data, such as some types of medical
data, might be recognized out of context as individual
data, but be unattributable to any given individual.
Other data, such as facial images, may be immediately recognizable as individualized data belonging to
an individual, even out of context, although locating
the individual may be costly. These various types of
data exist on a contextual continuum, but all show to
some degree that in order for data to be meaningful
data – the kind of data with which Floridi is concerned – it must be contextual data. It cannot stand
alone. Meaningful data arises only in the context of
interactivity; it is less meaningful, and perhaps even
devoid of meaning as it becomes increasingly acontextual.
In a similar vein it is also with noting the overlapping, sometimes fragmented allocation of rights in
data representations. At times, the assumptions
adopted by diﬀerent strands of information law may
be at odds with one another. As mentioned previously, the common law right of privacy assigns to the
private subject of a photograph a certain degree of
control over the photograph’s commercial publication. Such rights align with the second of the three
approaches outlined above. But at the same time,
copyright in the photograph lies with the photographer, with the observer or recorder of the data. The
assumption underlying copyright in photographs has
been that the resulting image is constitutes the original expression of the photographer. Even if the
image is of another individual, that individual is
unlikely to be regarded as the ‘‘author’’ of the image;
rather, it is the photographer’s creative selection of
lighting, camera angle, exposure, and so on that is
reﬂected in the assignment of ownership of the image.
The exclusive rights granted by copyright may be
modulated or overridden by overlapping rights
granted to the subject of a photo: rights of publicity
or of privacy may sometimes give the subject a veto
over certain uses of the image. Such overlapping or
incomplete rights eﬀectively create a regime of shared
control. The practical eﬀect of these overlapping
rights runs contrary to the paradigm of property law,
which for both real and intellectual property has
assumed the ‘‘sole and despotic’’ control regime of
real property as its archetype (Burk 2003). But for
purposes of copyright, the third approach, holding
that the data representation properly belongs to the
observer, is the approach that prevails.
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The ethics of information law
In previous work I have noted that both privacy law
and intellectual property law display one of two
dominant rationales, characteristic of the jurisdiction
in which they originate (Burk 2006b). In the modern
global environment, the dominant information law
paradigms arise in either the United States or the
European Union, the former grounding its information law in a largely utilitarian rationale that focuses
upon the economic beneﬁts of information policy, the
later grounding its information law in a larger
deontological rationale that emphasizes the autonomy of the individual. These two ethical frameworks
in large measure deﬁne the terms for modern information law.
It is critical to recognize that although these ethical
values reﬂect the common structures of information
law, they do not ﬁt neatly into the typology already
outlined above. It would be appealing to assume that
because the second approach of the typology focuses
upon the individual observed, that it tends to uphold
the value of autonomy; while because the third tends
to focus on the observer, it tends to focus on incentives that uphold more utilitarian values. But blithely
mapping these structural frameworks to an accompanying ethical framework would be a mistake. Both
utility and autonomy are two edged swords, and
either the second or the third approaches – and for
that matter, possibly the ﬁrst and fourth – might be
pressed into service to promote either value.
In general, from a utilitarian perspective, incentives to generate valuable data should be placed with
the party most likely to respond to the incentives,
granted to the party most likely to invest in the creation of valuable data when oﬀered the reward of
ownership. It is not entirely clear how this principle
will play out in the case of an individual’s information. First, as indicated above, a good deal of information is recorded or thrown oﬀ unconsciously or
involuntarily, as a routine activity or a ‘‘data shadow.’’ It is not at all clear that we need to encourage
additional investment in such activity, or that we
would succeed if we tried. Other data representations
are the result of conscious activity on the part of the
individual.
It may be that there is value to be gained by
encouraging not the generation of personal data, but
the assembly of such data into collections. But here it
becomes clear that an individual’s data is a peculiar
commodity, often subject to market failure. For the
most part, personal data is a valuable market commodity only in the aggregate. (Stark-Meyering, Burk,
and Gurak 2004) Sports statistics aside, typically no
individual datum is worth very much; even the

collection of data associated with a given individual is
worth very little. The value of such individual data is
likely far less than the cost of negotiating a price for
it; it likely costs more to sell the data than the data is
worth, so no market for individual data is likely to
form.
Even in the case of celebrity data, where images
and persona are worth bargaining over, it is unclear
where a utilitarian calculus will lead. Statistics about
player performance are valuable to the athletes, to
their teams and their leagues. But the data are also
clearly valuable to the fans, who enjoy comparing,
discussing, and yes, playing fantasy sports with the
data. The number of fans is far larger than that of the
players, and a little value on the part of each fan may
in the aggregate exceed the value placed upon the
data by the player it depicts. Indeed, the fans may
suﬀer from a collective action problem: they may
value the data more as a group, although individually
less than the professional leagues, and if the fans have
no mechanism to express the group valuation, it may
go unappreciated.
Adopting autonomy as a goal is leads to equally
inchoate results. From the standpoint of autonomy,
ownership or control surely belongs with the individual whose personality is invested in the data. But
this logic begs the question of which individual that
might be. Within existing information law, for
example, the law of privacy and the law of copyright
point in diﬀerent directions; the former assumes that
it is the observed individual who is most invested in
the data, so that respect for autonomy is best served
by deferring to that individual’s preferences. But the
law of copyright assumes that the observer, the
photographer or painter or biographer, is the author
who is invested in the resulting work, and that
autonomy is best served by deferring to that individual’s preferences. The law of privacy and publicity
tell us on the one hand that we cannot use the
observed individual as a means to eﬀectuate the
observer’s purposes, but copyright tells us on the
other hand that we cannot allow the observer to be
used as means to eﬀectuate the observed individual’s
ends, either.
As a practical matter, the two bodies of law may
well be able to point in diﬀerent directions. There
need not be direct doctrinal conﬂict between the two
regimes; copyright does not extend to unoriginal facts
about the observed, while privacy law may. But the
assumptions underlying the assignment of ownership
or control in each instance are not so easily reconciled
when extrapolated to new and ubiquitous forms of
personal representations, as for example when the
holder of detailed data proﬁles wishes to sell the
proﬁles for targeted marketing. We have seen that we

INFORMATION ETHICS

AND THE

LAW

likely will receive little concrete guidance on the
allocation of control over such proﬁles from the
existing ethics of information law. The question
remains whether information ethics gives a clearer
guide to structuring allocations of control over data
representations.

Applying information ethics
Having surveyed the approaches adopted under various branches of information law, we are in a position
to consider how the doctrine in these areas might
align with a theory of information ethics. The outlook is fairly mixed. Areas of information law, such
as European data privacy, or the right of publicity,
that have adopted the second model would appear to
lend themselves readily to Floridi’s information ethics, as they tend to assume that the data representations they address arise from the individual and are
constitutive of the individual. But accepting such
compatibility too quickly would be a mistake. As I
have already indicated above, there remains in the
theory of information ethics a question as to what
data constitutes the individual, and what is simply
data about an individual’s actions. Given this distinction, we might wonder whether these apparently
compatible doctrines should assume that the information they contemplate is constitutive. For example, it may be that some of the information assigned
to the individual under data privacy laws is merely
part of the ‘‘data shadow’’ that is not constitutive
data, and so might just as properly be assigned to the
control of others.
By the same token, we are left in a quandary when
testing the converse proposition. Information ethics
as presently constituted oﬀers little guidance to test
whether there is a proper ﬁt with areas of information
law that do not assign control to the individual, in
determining whether the areas that have adopted the
ﬁrst, third, or fourth models address data that is not
constitutive of the individual, and so permissibly
assign control elsewhere. Certainly in many cases the
data representations that are left to the control of
someone other than the individual represented seem
highly individual, unique, and identiﬁable. But are
these the characteristics of constitutive data? Statistics about sports ﬁgures provide perhaps the most
sparse data representations possible, yet they are
distinctive, and information ethics does not seem to
assist us in determining whether the court in C.B.C.
Distribution correctly excluded them from the right of
publicity or not.
Thus, at least to date, the theory of information
ethics leaves open this central and exceptionally
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diﬃcult question as to what data is or ought to be
considered the individual’s data. To say as Floridi has
that invasion of privacy is akin to kidnapping or
assault rather than to trespass illustrates the point
that information is personal, rather than separate
from the individual. But it does not do so at a very
deep level. Much of trespass is about personality even
in the world of atoms; as Radin points out, stealing a
wedding ring is a conversion or trespass, but this is
not necessarily because of the market value of the
ring, it is because ring is an object by which the owner
has deﬁned himself and is constitutive of his personality (Radin 1982). The quick tour of data representations I have made here shows this to be even
more common in the world of bits; data representations are very often informational objects by which
individuals deﬁne themselves. Copyright and the
right of publicity may protect against forms of
informational trespass, but they are also very often
very much about protecting the identity of the individual (Heyman 2005).
To be sure, Floridi recognizes that information
may ‘‘overlap,’’ noting that if John is married to
Mary, this is information about both John and Mary
(Floridi 2005). But this treats the information as
something in the air, something hanging independently in space. We have seen that the law sometimes
adopts this stance, but treating the information as res
nullius still requires some theory as to who may
appropriate it, or where it is to be assigned. Just as
often, law treats information as constitutive of the
personality to whom it is attached; this seems more in
keeping with the constitutive theory of information
entities Floridi explicitly espouses. But even this
stance requires some theory as to which information
is constitutive of the individual. The information
captured in a portrait is as much about the artist that
painted it as it is about the individual who sat for it,
and law requires some theory of assignment when
conﬂicts between the interests of the two arise.
This gap in application poses a particular problem
with regard to the fourth model, where the data is
meaningful only in context, or where the generation
of personal data representations is a shared endeavor.
Such data representations are not merely data that
overlaps individuals, but data that would not exist
without the input or contribution of multiple individuals. And this may prove to comprise the majority
of cases; indeed one might argue that there is no data
representation that it not the result of shared or
communal interaction. Copyright law partially recognizes this in the concept of joint authorship; other
branches of information law assign fragmented control of data representations, to one party in one case,
to another party in another.
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A coherent theory of information ethics might be
enormously helpful in sorting out this tangle: whether
assignment of data should be split, and if so when, and
how. But this requires a more robust model of what
information constitutes the individual entity’s information, and that crucial aspect of the theory remains
undeveloped. So long as this is the case, the theory will
remain one of very limited legal application.

information ethics promises a coherent framework in
which to align the disparate branches of information
law, but it can only do so if it oﬀers some guidance as
to whom information belongs, either constitutively or
proprietarily. Thus application of information ethics
to information law must await a fuller theory of
information ethics, but perhaps recognizing the current gaps will assist the development of a fuller
theory.

Conclusion
I have shown in this essay that in several respects the
law addressing rights of privacy, rights of publicity,
and related intellectual property rights already treats
or tends toward treating personal data representations as constitutive of individuals, with the potential
of treating them as information entities. It would be a
relatively small adjustment in such cases to view the
representations covered by such law as Floridian
information objects, amenable to his theories of
information ethics. But in other respects the law of
privacy and intellectual property is ethically incoherent, or points in a diﬀerent direction, adopting
disparate models to assign responsibility and control
for data representations. A theory of information
ethics might lend coherence to these bodies of law,
harmonizing the treatment of data across a variety of
legal doctrines. As matters stand now many aspects
of information law would require re-alignment in
order to be compatible with such a theory.
This lack of coherence of course stems in part from
general incongruities in the law itself. Development of
legal doctrine occurs unevenly as a matter of necessity; as Justice Holmes famously remarked, the life of
the law is not logic, but experience (Haack 2007). But
the lacunae in such an approach to information law
are not merely due to legal inconsistencies: it is by no
means certain that information ethics itself is yet up
to the task or providing a global theory for information law. In particular, it is critical to determine
under Floridi’s framework what information constitutes the self and what does not. The constitutive
claim somewhat begs the question. To say that an
information entity is constituted by his information
assumes that we know what information is ‘‘his’’ or
‘‘her’’ information; it assumes at least a theory of
association if not of ownership.
Although Floridi has begun to address certain of
the challenges that a robust theory of information
ethics will face (Floridi 2006), this initial ‘‘test drive’’
of information ethics through the legal landscape
reveals some additional challenges that become
apparent at the point where information ethics is
applied to legal relationships. A richer theory of
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